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for Meaningful Evaluation of Price-Control Policies
The article in 2007 by Roughead et al. comparing
Australian and US prices of 22 innovative medicines
concluded that “Australian prices for medicines repre-
senting signiﬁcant advances in therapy are similar to
those paid under key US programs” [1]. However, a
simple pricing comparison of 22 drugs is not sufﬁcient
to resolve the debate about whether price-control poli-
cies undermine capacity to discover and develop future
advances in therapies. Further research is required to
determine the impact of price-control policies on inter-
national trade policy, as highlighted by Ridley [2], and
on pharmaceutical R&D incentive.
What DoesThis Study Mean:Are Australian
Prices a Disincentive to Pharmaceutical R&D?
As Ridley pointed out, the aggregate harm for research
incentives could be substantial if many countries use
price controls [2]. Although Roughead replied that
Australia uses a “pharmaceutical valuation system”
rather than a “price control system” [3], the Pharma-
ceutical Beneﬁts Advisory Committee’s undisclosed
threshold range for accepting cost-per-health-gain to
make funding recommendations is a willingness-to-
pay policy component that directly inﬂuences price
and proportion of patients funded.
For example, Australia is providing much lower
return on investment than suggested by lower face-
value prices if access to drugs is also more restricted
than in the United States. Although Roughead esti-
mates the Australian price of Enbrel to be 2.6% higher
compared to the US price, based on Wholesaler Ac-
quisition Cost (WAC) prices, Australian access is
restricted to only approximately 2% of patients with
rheumatoid arthritis (RA) [4], compared to 20% in the
United States [5]. Australian RA patients are required
to have greater disease severity than in Europe to
access subsidized Enbrel treatment [6,7], and it is likely
that this also explains the large difference in access
compared to the United States.
Assuming other pharmaceutical innovation incen-
tives are equal (such as ability to adjust prices for
inﬂation, rewards for R&D expenditure, pharmaceu-
tical demand policies, and average prices of medical
substitutes), then a country that pays higher prices
provides greater incentive for continued innovation
than a country with lower prices [2]. Therefore, price
comparison studies could augment the understanding
of whether local price-control policies act as disincen-
tives to pharmaceutical R&D only if they are carefully
designed to address this issue. Any such studies should
address the following:
1. Price data and access data are most valuable for
price-control policy evaluation if collected
together in the same study. Previous price com-
parison studies have included these types of criti-
cal price-access relationship data [8], such as lag
time from registration to reimbursement and pro-
portion of patients with the condition that have
access.
2. An appropriate deﬁnition to capture “innovation”
is needed. This may need to be broader than that
used by Roughead. Some so-called “follow-on”
medicines represent a critical, incremental step
toward innovation that may be valued by society
and, thus, may warrant inclusion.
3. In the Roughead study, the exclusion of registered
medicines because they were not reimbursed and
therefore not likely to be consumed in one country
(but were consumed in the other) represents a
critical ﬂaw because nonconsumption due to non-
reimbursement is probably a factor related to
price-control policies. A standard method for ran-
domly selecting representative basket(s) of medi-
cines should be established to ensure the resulting
average price of the basket of drugs accurately
reﬂects what is available in each country.
4. Methodologies need to be developed to enable
price comparisons between fragmented markets
like the United States and more centralized
markets like Australia. Roughead showed that
Australian Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Scheme (PBS)
ex-manufacturer prices were 4.2% higher on
average compared to US Federal Supply Schedule
(FSS) ex-manufacturer prices. However, PBS prices
account for nearly 100% of Australian prescrip-
tion medicine expenditure, whereas US FSS pre-
scription drug purchases currently account for only
a small portion of the total federal drug expendi-
tures. The federal drug expenditures account for
less than 28%of the total drug expenditures within
the US system (Fig. 1). A second comparison
showed that Australian prices were, on average,
“lower by 14.4% when compared with WAC.” A
valid average US price could be obtained for more
accurate international comparisons using index
methods weighted either by the proportion of
medicines consumed [8], by the distribution of
product sales, or by the proportion of expenditure
under each of the various funding systems.10.1111/j.1524-4733.2007.00300.x
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5. As Ridley discussed, lower average incomes may
affect prices [2]. Therefore, the Purchase Power
Parity method, as used by Roughead, should be
considered and further methods may need to be
developed to fully address income disparities
between countries.
Overall, the Roughead price comparison study high-
lights that additional research is needed on price-
control policy evaluation before inferences can be
made about whether Australia’s price-control policies
are stiﬂing pharmaceutical innovation.––The Wyeth
Enbrel Pricing and Reimbursement Special Issues
Group (Delia Schaffer, Michael Nobes, Trish Palmer,
Peter Poggioli, Donald Han, and Richard Truex),
Wyeth Australia Pty Ltd, Pharmaceuticals Division,
Sydney (Baulkham Hills), NSW, Australia.
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Figure 1 Percentage of US pharmaceutical spending under the various US funding mechanisms. Data sourced from US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMMS), ofﬁce of the Actuary, 2005.The funding mechanisms represented in this graph each pay different ex-manufacturer drug prices. Federal
Supply Schedule (FSS) ex-manufacturer prices apply to only a small proportion of federal third-party payments.
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